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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellee will respond to the issues raised in Appellant's 
Brief and the order raised by Appellant. 
The standard of review for each of the issues raised as 
stated by the Appellant is the clearly erroneous and abuse of 
discretion standard. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee strongly objects to a number of the exhibits 
contained in Appellant's brief. Many of the exhibits are not 
matters of record and are therefore not appropriate exhibits in 
an appellate brief. The exhibits to which Appellee objects are 
Exhibit C, Exhibit F, Exhibit H, Exhibit I, and Exhibit J. These 
exhibits are not appropriately before this Court and should not 
be used in the Court's determination of the issues presented. 
A, Nature and Disposition of the Case 
This is a claim for property damage brought by the 
Appellant pursuant to an accident which occurred on or about 
March 26, 1989, in Provo, Utah. Late at night, the Appellant was 
pulling into a 7-11 gas station when he struck cement filled 
steel posts which were placed beside the gas pump island. The 
Appellant, the plaintiff in the proceedings below, filed a 
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complaint against Southland Corporation ("Southland") on or about 
October 21, 1989. Trial was scheduled for July 16, 1990. The 
Appellant failed to appear at the trial. Appellant has blamed 
this failure to appear on his medical condition. Counsel for the 
Appellee, the defendant in the proceedings below, appeared at 
trial. Pursuant to that proceeding an order of dismissal was 
entered in favor of Southland. 
Appellant filed a motion for new trial and a notice of 
appeal on or about July 29, 1990. Appellant's motion for a new 
trial was denied on or about September 29, 1990. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Due to the fact that Appellant failed to appear for the 
trial, no adequate trial record of the proceedings below has been 
created. Therefore, it is difficult to support the factual 
statements by citation to the transcript as is proper. A copy of 
the entire proceedings before Third Circuit Court Judge Paul 
Grant (three pages), is attached to this brief as Exhibit A. 
When Mr. Barron failed to appear for trial, Appellee's 
counsel made a motion to dismiss and a claim for bad faith. 
Appellee's counsel listed a number of cases in which the 
Appellant was currently or recently involved. In his discussion 
of these cases, Appellee's counsel stated that all of them had 
been dismissed. Appellee's counsel did not go into the 
background or nature of the dismissals of each case. The purpose 
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for discussing each of these different cases was to show that 
none of these cases had been pursued to a judgment, and, 
moreover, none of these cases had resulted in a judgment in favor 
of the Appellant. 
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial on July 29, 1990. 
This motion was denied by the trial judge on September 29, 1990. 
On two separate occasions, October 1, 1989, and January or 
February 1990, the Appellant made objections and motions for 
sanctions under URCP Rule 11 against defense counsel for alleged 
violations of that rule. At the time this case was dismissed on 
July 31, 1990, the trial court had not rendered decisions on 
those motions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A claim of "fraud upon the court" by one of the 
parties under Utah law must be raised by filing an action 
separate from the underlying case. As the Appellant failed to 
raise a claim of "fraud upon the court" in the proper manner it 
should not be addressed by this Court. However, even if the 
Court reaches the merits of this issue, Appellee's counsel did 
not commit "fraud upon the court" since Appellee's counsel never 
prevented the Appellant from presenting his position at trial. 
Moreover, Appellee did not affirmatively misrepresent facts to 
the trial court. 
2. The Appellant's motion for a new trial was 
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inappropriate under Rule 59(a)(3) since new trials are granted 
under this section for accident or surprise at trial rather than 
the inability of a party to attend the trial. However, should 
this Court reach the merits of this issue, the trial court judge 
properly denied the motion for a new trial since there was not 
sufficient evidence given by the Appellant to justify a new 
trial. 
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
granting judgment to the Appellee while there were outstanding 
Rule 11 motions against Appellee's counsel. Rule 11 motions have 
nothing to do with the merits of the case and do not preclude 
judgment being entered. Moreover, it is standard practice and it 
is suggested that decisions regarding Rule 11 motions be delayed 
until the end of litigation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A. A CLAIM OF "FRAUD UPON THE COURT- IS 
INAPPROPRIATELY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
ALTERNATIVELY, APPELLEE'S COUNSEL DID NOT 
COMMIT "FRAUD UPON THE COURT." 
Appellant's claim for "fraud upon the court" is 
inappropriately before this Court. Under Utah lawf an action for 
"fraud upon the court" must be raised in an action separate from 
the action in which the alleged fraud took place. "Fraud upon 
the court" cannot be raised by a motion in the underlying case 
and therefore cannot be a point of contention on appeal. 
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We believe and hold that where "fraud upon the 
court" is the gravamen of the proceeding, such 
proceeding must be pursued in an independent 
action by filing a separate suit, paying the 
statutory filing fee therefor (which was not 
done here), and requiring the statutory 
issuance and service of process. 
Shaw v. Pilcher, 341 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 1959). See also: 
McGavin v. McGavin, 494 P.2d 283, 284 (Utah 1972). 
In the present case, as was the case in Shaw, the party 
complaining of "fraud upon the court" has failed to raise that 
claim in a separate proceeding. The Appellant in the present 
case has not filed a separate action, paid the statutory filing 
fee, or perfected process as is required. Therefore, the issue 
of "fraud upon the court" is not properly before this Court and 
should be dismissed. 
B. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OP BY APPELLANT DO NOT 
AMOUNT TO THE "FRAUD" NECESSARY FOR SETTING 
ASIDE A JUDGMENT. 
Under Utah law, in order to use fraud to set aside a 
judgment, it must be the type of fraud which "has the effect of 
depriving the other party of the opportunity to present his claim 
or defense." Haner v. Haner, 373 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1962). 
The Haner court continues: 
This type of fraud, which is regarded as a 
fraud not only upon the opponent, but on the 
court itself, can be accomplished in a number 
of ways, such as making false statements or 
representations to the other party or to 
witnesses to prevent them from contesting the 
issues; or by that means or otherwise 
preventing the attendance of the parties or 
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witnesses; or by destroying or secreting 
evidence; so that a fair trial of the issues 
is effectively prevented. 
373 P.2d at 578-79. 
The actions complained of by the Appellant do not fall 
within any of the categories listed as appropriate categories for 
the setting aside of judgment due to fraud. The Appellee or 
Appellee's counsel in no way prevented the Appellant from 
appearing at trial or contesting his issues. Appellee and 
counsel for Appellee simply appeared at trial and made the 
appropriate motions in order to defend their position. 
Appellee's counsel was not required to make Appellant's case for 
him or to insure that the Appellant would be able to present his 
claims at a later date. 
It is the position of Appellee that Appellee's counsel did 
not make any fraudulent misrepresentations to the court. 
However, even if such statements had been made, they would not be 
grounds for setting aside the judgment. The Haner court 
continues: 
It is obvious that quite a different situation 
exists where there is no prevention of the 
party from contesting the issues in a trial 
and where the complaint is simply that one 
party presented perjured testimony or false 
evidence. This charge is simply a 
continuation of the same dispute which the 
trial was supposed to resolve. 
373 P.2d at 579. 
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Appellee vigorously denies that he presented any 
fraudulent misrepresentation to the court. However, even if 
Appellee's counsel made a misstatement to the court, this is not 
grounds for setting aside a judgment under Utah law. 
C. APPELLEE'S COUNSEL MADE NO FRAUD OR 
MISREPRESENTATION TO THE COURT. 
At the July 16, 1990 hearing on Appellee's Motion to 
Dismiss (see Exhibit A) Appellee's counsel represented to the 
Court that the Appellant had recently filed numerous claims 
against numerous defendants, and most, if not all of them, had 
been dismissed. Appellee's counsel then represented that he 
thought that an additional case brought by the Appellant against 
the State of Utah and the Utah State Tax Commission had been 
dismissed. Apparently, that case had been appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. Appellee's counsel made no representations 
as to how or why these cases were dismissed. The above 
representations made to the trial court by Appellee's counsel do 
not constitute "fraud upon the court." Appellee's counsel 
represented to the trial court that numerous other cases had been 
filed by the Appellant at approximately the same time and had 
been dismissed and did not elaborate further. Appellee's counsel 
had no duty to elaborate further and did not intentionally 
misrepresent any of the facts pertaining to Appellant's other 
litigation. 
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At page 24 of Appellant's brief, Appellant argues that ". 
. . the canon of ethics require one to advise the court fully of 
all material facts." The Appellant does not offer any authority 
for this proposition, but rather states: 
Appellant does not offer any case law or other 
authority because Appellant is not able to 
undertake legal research at this time, because 
he is not able to quickly or conveniently 
locate and drive to a law library with 
adequate resources appropriate to Utah law. 
This argument is made in accordance with 
standard ethical considerations. 
Brief of Appellant, footnote 8, page 30. 
There is absolutely no basis for the proposition that 
"standard ethical considerations" require an opposing party to 
make the case for his opponent. The representations made by 
Appellee's counsel to the trial court were substantially correct. 
At page 25 of Appellant's brief, he states that defense 
counsel "knowingly and with malicious intent" made false 
statements to the trial court. There is absolutely no evidence 
presented that would support a finding of knowing and malicious 
intent on the part of Appellee's counsel. Rather, as has been 
explained above, Appellee's counsel simply represented to the 
trial court that the plaintiff had filed numerous other suits at 
approximately the same time. Moreover, most if not all those 
suits had been dismissed. While Appellant certainly has every 
right to pursue remedies to valid claims in the judicial system, 
it is uncommon for this amount of litigation to be pursued at one 
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time. Appellee's counsel only wanted to point this out to the 
court. 
Under Utah law, Appellant's claim of "fraud against the 
court" by Appellee's counsel is inappropriately before this 
Court. Also, the acts complained of by the Appellant do not 
constitute the type of fraud by which a judgment can be set 
aside. If this Court feels it must reach the merits of this 
issue, it is clear that Appellee's counsel's representations to 
the trial court do not amount to "fraud upon the court." 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS 
INAPPROPRIATE. EVEN IF THE MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL WAS APPROPRIATE, APPELLANT DID 
NOT PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT BASIS ON WHICH A 
NEW TRIAL COULD BE GRANTED. 
Appellant claims he was unable to attend the July 16, 1990 
trial because of mitral valve prolapse syndrome which renders him 
incapacitated for hours at a time. Appellant claims that on the 
day of the hearing he was incapacitated due to this illness. 
Appellant based his motion for a new trial on Rule 
59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 59(a)(3) 
states that a new trial may be granted for "accident or surprise, 
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." This 
basis for a new trial is usually construed as requiring accident 
or surprise at trial, rather than accident or surprise in 
prohibiting attendance at trial. See, Anderson v. Bradley, 590 
9 
P.2d 339 (Utah 1979); Powers v. Gene's Bldg Materials, Inc. 567 
P.2d 174 (Utah 1977); (A "surprise" at trial which could have 
been easily guarded against by utilization of available discoveiry 
procedures may not serve as a ground for a new trial under 
subdivision (a)(3)); (Rule 59(a)(3) requires that the moving 
parties show that ordinary prudence was exercised to guard 
against the accident or surprise); Ericksen v. Wasatch Manor, 
802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990); (because the depositions of three 
witnesses were taken by the defendant, the defendant had notice 
of the expected testimony. Thus, no unfair surprise was shown 
and a new trial was not warranted); see also: Chournos v. 
D'Aanillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982); Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 
695 (Utah 1977); Mver ex rel. Myer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 
(Utah 1984).) 
There is no case law interpreting Rule 59(a)(3) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which would allow this rule to 
serve as the basis for a new trial when the accident or surprise 
did not occur at trial, but rather which prevented a party from 
attending trial. Therefore, this is an appropriate basis on 
which to grant a new trial. 
However, even if the Rule 59(a)(3) was an appropriate 
grounds for a new trial, Appellant failed to provide a sufficient 
basis on which a new trial could be granted. Under Utah law, a 
trial judge in granting or denying a motion for a new trial has 
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broad latitude, and should not be overturned by an appellate 
court absent a clear abuse of discretion by a trial judge. 
Barson by and through Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 
P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1982); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981). It is not an 
abuse of discretion in this case for the trial court to have 
found that there was an inadequate basis for the Appellant to 
claim that he was prevented from attending trial due to accident 
or surprise. 
The Appellant has provided absolutely no medical 
documentation in support of his position that he was 
incapacitated on the day of his hearing. The Appellant did 
submit three affidavits in support of the proposition that he was 
incapacitated on that day. These affidavits are contained in 
Exhibit E of Appellant's brief. However, the documents found in 
Exhibit J of Appellant's brief were never submitted to the trial 
court for the trial court's us in its determination on the motion 
for a new trial. As suchf those documents constitute new 
evidence which is inappropriate to present for the first time on 
appeal. 
Appellant filed his own affidavit stating that he was 
incapacitated (see Exhibit E of Appellant's Brief). 
Appellant has also submitted an affidavit of his apartment 
building manager (see Exhibit E of Appellant's Brief) which 
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states that he had seen the Appellant incapacitated prior to the 
day of the hearing. The manager then stated that on the day of 
the hearing, the Appellant did not come out of his apartment 
until early evening. The apartment manager does not claim to 
have seen the Appellant incapacitated on the day of the hearing. 
The only medical affidavit submitted by the Appellant is 
the Affidavit of Michael Lowry, M.D. (see Exhibit E of 
Appellant's Brief). In his affidavit, Dr. Lowry does diagnose 
the Appellant with mitral valve prolapse. However, he does not 
state that the symptoms of this condition actually result in 
capacitation, and further, does not express an opinion as to 
whether the Appellant actually became incapacitated on the day of 
the hearing or even if it was likely that the Appellant became 
incapacitated on that day. 
Due to the lack of evidence supporting Appellant's 
proposition that he was incapacitated on the day of the hearing, 
it was not an abuse of discretion of the trial court to deny a 
new trial. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE APPELLEE WHILE 
THERE WERE OUTSTANDING RULE 11 MOTIONS AGAINST 
APPELLEE'S COUNSEL. 
During the course of litigation at the trial level, the 
Appellant filed motions for sanctions against Appellee's counsel 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11. These motions had 
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not been ruled upon by the trial judge as of the date of the 
dismissal of the case. However, this is not a valid ground for 
appeal since the motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 have 
nothing whatsoever to do with the merits of the case and could 
not in any way affect the judgment rendered. Since this issue in 
no way affects the judgment rendered in this casef it is not an 
appropriate issue for this Court to address. 
The 1983 Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, upon which Utah Rule of Civil Procedure is based 
states: 
A party seeking sanctions should give notice 
to the court and the offending party promptly 
upon discovering a basis for doing so. 
However, it is anticipated that in the case of 
pleadings, the sanctions issue under Rule 11 
will normally be determined at the end of 
litigation, and in the case of motions, at the 
time when the motion is decided or shortly 
thereafter. (emphasis added.) 
Under this Advisory Committee Note, the trial court has the 
discretion to rule on the propriety of sanctions under Rule 11 at 
any time. Since the Rule 11 motions have no bearing on the 
outcome of the underlying case, which is an action for property 
damage, the trial court is within his discretion to decide on the 
propriety of sanctions at a time after a judgment in the 
underlying case has been rendered. 
Case law also supports this proposition: 
It makes no difference that the district court 
decided to impose the sanctions for the 
13 
litigation only after the post-judgment 
motions, or that the court changed its prior 
position with respect to sanctions in doing 
so. The Advisory Committee Notes to Amended 
Rule 11 explicitly state that vthe time when 
sanctions are to be imposed rests in the 
discretion of the trial judge.' 
McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
Not only was the trial court's decision to wait until the 
end of litigation to decide on sanctions within the trial court's 
discretion, but some cases have held that, as a general rule, a 
trial court should wait until the end of litigation to decide on 
Rule 11 sanctions. 
A district court's decision of whether to 
impose Rule 11 sanctions based on the 
complaint should wait until the end of 
litigation. See Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, Advisory Committee Note. 
Donaldson v. Clark, 786 F.2d 1570, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986). 
It is not a proper grounds for appeal to complain that a 
trial court rendered judgment prior to the time Rule 11 
sanctions were decided. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the three issues presented by Appellant provide a 
basis on which to set aside the judgment. The issue of "fraud 
upon the court" is not properly before this Court since a claim 
for "fraud upon the court" should be brought by separate action. 
Moreover, the acts complained of by the Appellant do not amount 
to "fraud upon the court." The trial court did not abuse its 
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discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a new trial since 
the Appellant moved for a new trial on inappropriate grounds and 
the Appellant did not provide an adequate basis on which to grant 
a new trial. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to enter judgment against the Appellant while there were 
motions for Rule 11 sanctions outstanding against Appellee's 
counsel. 
Accordingly, Appellee respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the trial court's rulings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ / day of August, 1991. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
TSXf. /TSAJOOGOS 
kdA 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby xierrtify that//1 cajuwffed to be mailed postage 
prepaid, on the «*** day of /n'ytisJy 1991, four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing^ to the following: 
William Paul Barron, Jr. Pro Se 
11475 Holiday Way 
Hillsboro OH 45133-9368 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
; 
-oOo-
* % 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNT1, 
Case No. ^2p)L#A24 CW<5* 
MOTION 1)6 DISMISS^ ^ 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, 
7-11 STORES, CITGO PETROLEUM 
AND KEMPER GROUP, 
Defendants. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that/on the 16th day of July, 1990, 
the above-entitled matter came' on for hearing before the 
Honorable Paul G. Grant, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
No appearance 
MR. T. J. TSAKALOS 
Attorney at Law 
4 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
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1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3
 THE COURT: Barron vs. Southland Corporation, 
4
 MR. TSAKALOSr (Inaudible) Taskalos on behalf Qf 
5
 Southland Corporation and Citgo Petroleum* Itve checked down. 
6
 the hall, he's not here, we sent him notice of the trialf at 
7
 least the plaintiff in this matter. 
8
 THE COURT; Let's give him five and if he doesn't come 
9
 I in, then we'll strike it* 
MR. TASAKALOS: Thank you, your Honor, 
11
 (Whereupon, the Court handled unrelated matters.) 
12
 THE COURT: Is Mr. Barron here? 
13
 MR. TSAKALOS: Barron is not here, your Honor, 
14
 J THE COURT: I presume I will hear your motion. 
MR. TSAKALOS: My motion is to dismiss with prejudice, 
and for the Court record, Mr. Barron was driving his car and rap 
17
 into our pumps and sued us. And this— 
18 THE COURT: Well, why didn't your pumps get out of the 
19 way? 
20 MR. TSAKALOS: Well, because they weren't fast enough. 
21 THE COURT: Oh. 
22 MR. TSAKALOSL I also brought a claim for bad faith in 
23 this, your Honor. Just for the record, in October of L89, he 
24 brought a malpractice suit on his own against a doctor in L.D.S. 
25 Hospital and IHC, and that has been dismissed. On June 26, '89, 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 ? 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
15 
16 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
he sued Charter Summit Hospital and several people and that— 
pro se, and that nas been dismissed. On June 25, '89, he sued 
Midvale.City and Midvale P.D. and that was dismissed. On 
October 31 of '89, he sued the State of California and the 
California Department of Food & Agriculture, 'cause they stopped 
him at the border, wouldn't allow him to bring in fruit and 
vegetables. That was dismissed in the United States District 
Court. On November 29, '89, he re-filed that suit again and that 
has been dismissed. 
November 16, '89, he sued the State of Utah and the 
11
 Utah State Tax Commission for his taxes. I think that one has 
12
 J been dismissed, and then he sued us when our pumps did not get 
out of his way, and now has not appeared. 
14
 THE COURT: And your claim for attorneyls fees is how 
15
 I much? 
MR. TSAKALOS: I will prepare an affidavit. 
17
 I THE COURT: All right. If you'll send that with the 
18
 judgment. 
19
 I MR. TSAKALOS: Thank you, your Honor 
20 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
21 
22 | * * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
4
 STATE OF UTAH 
5 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that WILLIAM PAUL BARRON. JR. vs. 
SOUTHLAND CORPORATION was electronically recorded by the 
6 | THIRD Circuit Court, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Utah. 
That the said witnesses were, before examination, duly 
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
11 | the truth in said cause. 
That the said testimony of said witnesses was electronicall) 
recorded, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into 
13 t)rPe writing, and that a true, and correct transcription of 
14 J said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the 
foregoing pages numbered from 2 to __3 , inclusive 
and said witnesses testified and said as in the foregoing 
16
 annexed testimony. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
this 29 day of MAY • , 19 91 . 
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